Epistemic positions and Philosophy for Children

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This paper examines the impact on Philosophy for Children (P4C) of student and teacher conceptions about the nature of knowledge, truth and meaning. It argues that sophisticated epistemic positions are as necessary for productive P4C inquiry as complex thinking and a Community of Inquiry. Drawing on the empirical and theoretical work of Perry, of Paul, and of Daniel et al., this paper will show how simple epistemic positions can cause difficulties for P4C because they are inadequate for dealing with the pluralism of philosophy, they block the possibility of dialogue and inquiry, and they lead to misconceptions about the epistemic aims of P4C. For example, a dualist epistemological position where answers are taken to be either right or wrong as determined by authority, leads to the abandonment of inquiry. “Just tell us the answers!” the dualist demands. A relativist epistemic position regards all answers as equally good and rejects the possibility of progress in philosophy. “There are no right or wrong answers in philosophy” the relativist might claim. Unless knowledge, truth and meaning are taken to be inter-subjective reflective judgements that can be better or worse rather than right or wrong, neither P4C students nor teachers can recognise or guide philosophical progress in P4C. Without such a complex epistemic position we cannot get past the complaint that “We’re just going around in circles.”
The two main ingredients for a successful, productive philosophical dialogue, according to the Philosophy for Children (P4C) literature, seem to be the development of cognitive and social skills and dispositions. P4C texts include advice, tools, processes and exercises for helping students to move from simple to complex thinking, from monologue to dialogue and from individualism to a Community of Inquiry. For example, Cam (2006) writes about thinking tools to support philosophical inquiry; Lipman (2003) stresses the importance of critical, creative and caring thinking within a Community of Inquiry; and Splitter and Sharp detail the stages of growth of a community of philosophical inquiry (1995, 148-149). In this paper, however, I argue that there is at least one other ingredient that is necessary for successful, productive philosophical dialogue, that has not received sufficient attention in the P4C literature: the development of sophisticated epistemic positions. I argue that learning to philosophise involves developing sophisticated positions about the nature and acquisition of knowledge, meaning and truth as much as it involves developing cognitive and social skills and dispositions. These positions determine how we conceive of and use the skills and how we view and value the achievements and outcomes of philosophy.

I am not arguing that epistemic positions have had no attention in the P4C literature, but only that they need more attention. An explicit articulation of the different unsophisticated and problematic positions students and teachers tend to take, and the difficulties that result, I argue, will help to make sense of some of the difficulties we face in setting up a successful P4C class. Simple epistemic positions are as much of a drawback for P4C as are lack of a mature Community of Inquiry or lack of complex thinking skills and dispositions. The reflective philosophical thinking of P4C requires not only the development of intersubjective dialogue involving complex cognitive and social skills, but also the development of complex epistemological positions.

For this paper I will draw on Perry (1970, 1981), Daniel et al. (2000, 2002, 2005, 2008) and Paul and Elder (1994, 1995, 2002), who each show how students tend to take particular epistemic positions and how these lead to pedagogical difficulties. I will describe these epistemic positions and the difficulties they present for P4C in more detail. Although I will not attempt to give a comprehensive plan for resolving these difficulties in this paper, I argue that they require the same level of attention that has been given to the education of thinking and the development of a Community of Inquiry in P4C.

Some difficulties for P4C

A number of difficulties that commonly occur in P4C classes are illustrated in the following discussion about the question: “What is racism?” I argue that these difficulties can be attributed (at least partially) to underdeveloped epistemic positions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Student</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student 1</td>
<td>Racism is treating Chinese or Aboriginal people badly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student 2</td>
<td>Yeah, but everyone is treated badly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student 3</td>
<td>Some races have had it really bad though – you know like slavery.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student 4</td>
<td>I’d hate to be a slave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student 5</td>
<td>I reckon my Mum treats me like a slave.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student 6</td>
<td>I bet I have more work to do at home than you do ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student 7</td>
<td>But they reckon that slavery is wrong. That’s real racism.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Student 1: You’re all wrong. Racism is when a minority is treated badly. Racism is only if someone thinks that, you know, African-Americans are dumb and so they don’t give them a job.

Student 3: We’ve already said that. We’re just going around in circles and I’m lost.

Teacher: So what is racism then?

Student 5: I reckon it’s making fun of other races.

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1. I use the term ‘P4C’ to refer to a type of philosophical pedagogy that is broader than Lipman and Sharp’s original curriculum materials, but which has arisen out of and is indebted to the these materials. Although I concentrate on P4C in this paper, much of what I say also applies to any philosophical pedagogy.

1. Unless specified, future references to Perry, Daniel and Paul will be to these books and articles.
Student 2  ‘Making fun’ isn’t right. It’s more serious than that.
Student 1  That’s just semantics. I don’t care what anyone else says, racism is treating a race badly.
Student 4  We can’t figure this out miss; why don’t you just tell us the answer?
Teacher  No, you’re doing fine. Don’t forget there are no right and wrong answers in philosophy.
Student 9  Well I reckon the answer just depends on whose opinion you ask.
Student 6  Yeah. Whatever you think is the right answer for you.
Student 8  Hang on, I just found ‘racism’ in the dictionary… Racism is: “Hatred or intolerance of another race or other races.” We got it wrong when we said it was treating people badly.
Student 7  Miss, what’s the point of this discussion? We should’ve gone straight to the dictionary.
Teacher  Don’t give up too easily. Let’s go back to the idea that racism is when a racial minority group is treated badly. This idea is not quite right, but I think we can make some progress if we pursue it a bit further. The minority group is being treated badly, but how else could we describe their treatment?
Student 1  I’m not sure.
Teacher  What is it about the bad treatment that makes it racist?
Student 2  The minority race doesn’t like it.
Teacher  Almost. Try again.
Student 2  It’s different from how the majority are treated.
Teacher  Now you’ve got it. Racism is when a minority race is treated differently from the majority race. So, is racism ever acceptable?
Student 3  Maybe racism could be good when it gives a minority more opportunity?
Teacher  Why do you think that?
Student 3  Well, it’s good if people who have had a hard time, like the Indigenous Australians get extra stuff.
Teacher  Maybe, but isn’t this unfair on the white people? (Students murmur and the teacher takes that as agreement) Let’s see if we can get a better answer.

The first half of this discussion illustrates the complex pluralism of philosophy and also the inability of students to make sense of it. Multiple plausible answers are suggested, but students are not sure what to do with these to move forward. At times they seem to think that they progress with philosophical inquiry by swapping opinions and saying whatever they like, rather than getting to the bottom of an issue through reasoning and argumentation. At other times they seem to think that they can resolve philosophical issues by appealing to an inappropriate epistemic authority. In this case they tried the dictionary, but in other cases they might appeal to expert opinion, ‘scientific proof’ or ‘the facts’. At yet other times potentially useful suggestions are made, but these are generally disregarded as just another opinion.

My diagnosis is that the first half of this discussion is philosophically unproductive because the epistemic positions that students’ take are inadequate for dealing with the complex and controversial nature of philosophy. In the face of a range of plausible philosophical views, where none seem to be simply ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, some of the students end up confused and cannot figure out what is going on. Others resort to a dogmatic position and assert their opinion come what may, while others retreat to an equally problematic relativist position and think that it is all a matter of opinion and so discussion is pointless. Some cannot understand why there is so much disagreement and discussion when they should just be able to get the
right answer and move on. Others see no value in the continuing discussion once they have stated their opinion.

The second half of the discussion, after student 7 suggests the discussion has no point and they would be better off just reading the dictionary, is equally problematic because now the teacher takes an epistemic position that is inadequate for the complexity of philosophy. In the first half of the discussion the teacher allowed students to say what they liked, but in the second half they change tack. Now their interventions indicate what line of inquiry is ‘correct’ and they direct students to the authoritative understanding. The discussion does get somewhere, but only because the teacher simplifies the issues and ignores possible disagreements and complexities.

What is missing in both halves of the discussion is students and teacher taking a clear epistemic position of critical pluralism and seeing the discussion as an exercise of dialogical reflective thinking (Dewey, 1916, 1933) in order to make meaning (Splitter & Sharp, 1995; Lipman 2003; Lipman et al., 1980), reasonable judgements (Paul, 1994, 347-348) or warranted assertions (Dewey, 1938).

Epistemic positions

What I mean by a ‘position’ in this context is a basic conceptual structure for making meaning, or the framework through which we interpret and conceive our experiences. Alternatively it might be called a form, pattern or paradigm. Daniel et al. (2002) describe ‘position’ as a perspective or frame of reference. I follow Perry (1970, 1981) in preferring the term ‘position’ to indicate a place or vantage point from which we view the world. A position can be conceptualised in the way psychologists describe conceptual stages or structures, or the way philosophers describe philosophical positions.1 They are not necessarily conscious or articulated and may be more like what Frank Jackson (1998) calls implicit ‘folk beliefs.’

A position is the conceptual framework that organises and colours what we experience, do and value. Thus the position taken by students “strongly influences, limits, or even dictates” (Perry, 1970, 92) their perception of what happens in the P4C classroom and thus the point (or lack of point) of P4C.

As epistemic positions, they are “the assumptions and expectations a person holds at a given time in regard to the nature and origins of knowledge and value” (Perry, 1970, 42). They organise and colour our conceptions of the nature, production and acquisition of knowledge, ideas and perspectives, as well as of legitimate epistemic aims.

Theories of epistemic positions

Perry, Daniel et al., and Paul each describe three roughly similar epistemological positions that students take. These three do not describe the positions that it is logically possible for students to take, but the positions that students actually take. Following Perry, I call them dualism, relativism and critical pluralism.

Perry documents these positions being taken by liberal arts University students as part of a sequence or developmental process that starts with dualism and moves to relativism before finally reaching critical pluralism. Students take different epistemic positions in response to, and as a way of making sense of, what Perry terms ‘multiplicity’. An experience of multiplicity is an experience of multiple plausible, contradictory answers and alternatives, rather than

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1. I make an explicit connection here between psychological stages and philosophical positions (without claiming they are identical). Although psychologists might be more concerned with the natural development of stages and philosophers might be more concerned with the rational justification of positions, the two are similar. See especially the neo-Fragelian cognitive acceleration theorists such as Adel & Shayer (2002), whose descriptions of cognitive stages and how we move to higher stages is very similar to a description of philosophical positions and how we move to a better position. Psychological stages, like philosophical positions are conceptions for making sense of the world. We modify them and develop more sophisticated conceptions when we are confronted by challenges that cannot be dealt with by our current stage of thinking or philosophical position. We develop a new and improved conception to deal with the dissonant experience. The main difference between psychological stages and philosophical positions may be how explicit or implicit we are about them and how conscious we are about changing them. The movement from one psychological stage to another may be largely unconscious, while the move from one philosophical position to another may be largely conscious in response to explicitly articulated problems with one's position.
simple, clear-cut unambiguous answers. Thus students develop their epistemic positions when confronted with:

- Complexity, vagueness, ambiguity, contingency, contextualism and shades of grey
- Uncertainty, doubt and the unknown
- Debate, difference of opinion and disagreement among authorities
- Diversity and plurality of answers, ideas, perspectives, interpretations and points of view
- Indeterminacy of evidence and reasons; no straight-forward criteria for judging right or wrong and correct or incorrect; and good reasons for saying something is true and for saying it is false.

Daniel et al. document a similar development of epistemological positions in younger children aged 10-12. Daniel’s studies show that children develop these positions when they participate in P4C classes and are thus confronted with a philosophical multiplicity of the same sort that Perry’s subjects experienced at University. Perry argues that young adults develop these positions naturally over time when confronted by pluralism. Daniel argues that her results show that young children must be helped to develop more sophisticated positions, using the pedagogy of P4C and a trained P4C teacher as scaffolds for their learning.

Paul argues that students take the dualist or relativist epistemic positions by default when they do not apprehend more sophisticated standards for dealing with multiplicity. They understand ‘right answers’, ‘wrong answers’ and ‘mere opinion’, but they do not have a concept of ‘reasoned judgement’ where ideas are judged better or worse depending on the quality of reasoning supporting them (Paul, 1994, 347-348).

1. Another important distinction between Perry and Daniel et al.’s work is that “Perry first elaborated a theory that was then validated on the ground with university students, while Daniel et al.’s model emerged from the data collection in schools, that is, the experimentation came first and the theorisation came after” (Daniel, 2008, personal correspondence).

**The three epistemic positions**

In this section I present the three main epistemic positions that Perry, Daniel and Paul have identified and documented. Later I will summarise the features of these positions (see table 1), and discuss some variations. I will then identify some major implications of these positions for the practice and value of P4C, arguing that dualism and relativism prevent quality philosophical inquiry while critical pluralism supports it. Lastly I sketch some of the ways P4C could assist students and teachers to move to critical pluralism.

Let me be clear about my aim: I am describing the three epistemic positions that Perry and Daniel et al. have shown that students do in fact take and the consequences for P4C when students and teachers take these positions. Even though the terms I use for these positions have been used for different purposes and even though these positions are muddled, messy and could be described as oversimplified from an adult philosopher’s point of view, when I use the terms ‘dualist’ and ‘relativist’ in this paper, I refer only to these unsophisticated, muddled positions. I do not deny that more sophisticated epistemic positions are possible. In fact I am counting on it as I argue that developing sophisticated epistemic positions is the means to deal with the difficulties created by unsophisticated dualism and relativism.

1. **Dualism**: From the dualist position, knowledge and values are objective, certain and absolute. The dualist makes sense of multiplicity by classifying different beliefs and ideas in dualist categories: Right-wrong, true-false, correct-incorrect, good-bad, ... They see the world in terms of matters of fact (Paul, 1995, 27). Other labels for this position include: dogmatic absolutism (Paul & Elder, 2002, 10) and egocentric epistemology (Daniel, 2008, 39).

2. **Relativism**: From the relativist position, there is no objective knowledge, as our beliefs, theories and values are inherently and wholly relative, contingent and contextual. The relativist makes sense of multiplicity by classifying all perspectives as subjective or culturally relative opinions. They see the world in terms of matters of preference and opinion (Paul, 1995, 27). Other labels for this position include: subjective relativism (Paul & Elder, 2002, 10; Daniel et al., 2002, 14).

3. **Critical Pluralism**: The critical pluralist takes knowledge to be objective, as does a dualist, while rejecting the certainty and
absolutism associated with this position. They also retain the pluralism of relativism without drawing the relativist conclusion that ‘anything goes’. The critical pluralist makes sense of multiplicity by classifying different views and perspectives as more or less warranted or unwarranted and sees the world in terms of more or less well-reasoned judgements (Paul, 1994, 347-348; 1995, 27; Paul & Elder, 2002, 10). When presented with a range of alternative conceptions, the critical pluralist applies reflective, critical and inter-subjective thinking to judge some as better than others and judge some as erroneous and mistaken. Other labels for this position include: Committed relativism (Perry, 1970, 1981); objective or informed relativism (Daniel et al., 2002); and intersubjectivity (Daniel, 2008).

I do not claim that these positions are part of a necessary developmental process or that they exhaust all possible positions. For the purpose of this paper my claim is that these are positions that students can and do take and that when taken they cause difficulties for P4C. To put this more strongly (and at the risk of overstatement) I argue that if students or teachers take these positions, this blocks the practice of P4C in the same way that P4C practice is blocked when students or teachers lack adequate cognitive and social skills or dispositions. If students or teachers take these positions, the dialogical, intersubjective, critical philosophical inquiry necessary for P4C cannot get off the ground and so for it to be successful, P4C students and teachers need to develop more sophisticated positions. In other words, critical pluralism is a necessary precondition of a successful P4C class.

I also acknowledge that these positions are contextual in the sense that one person could, for example, take the epistemic position of relativism in relation to philosophy, dualism for mathematics and critical pluralism for history. On the basis of this, I will argue that one aim of P4C should be to have students reach the position of critical pluralism about philosophy, which is a necessary precondition of successful P4C practice. Reaching this position will take time and explicit attention, just as it does to learn to think for yourself with others and to develop a Community of Inquiry, which are the other necessary preconditions for P4C.

The versions of dualism, relativism and critical pluralism that I describe are not the most sophisticated, logically consistent versions of these positions. For example, the positions seem to run together the logically distinct issues of whether there is truth, how we find the truth, how we should evaluate claims to having the truth and how we should respond to disagreement and multiplicity. Nevertheless these are not ‘strawmen’. I am not arguing that all the logically possible, sophisticated versions of dualism or relativism that mature philosophers might develop are incompatible with P4C. I am arguing that the muddled and unsophisticated dualist and relativist positions that teachers and students in fact take cause difficulties for P4C, and so we need to address how to move students to more sophisticated, coherent and unproblematic positions.

I acknowledge the possibility that sophisticated versions of dualism or relativism may be legitimate alternatives to critical pluralism and may support the critical dialogue necessary for P4C. However, I argue later that as dualism and relativism become more sophisticated, they tend to become closer and closer to critical pluralism. Thus I use the term ‘critical pluralism’ to stand for a range of sophisticated positions that might include dualist and relativist elements. For example, a Hegelian or Socratic position has elements of unsophisticated dualism as it acknowledges that there are true and false philosophical answers. Yet it also includes elements of unsophisticated relativism as it also acknowledges that truth is only developed through dialogue and the clash of ideas, that we need to be fallible about our own current ideas which may turn out to be false. In arguing against relativism and dualism in favour or critical pluralism, I will argue that this sort of sophisticated position is closer to critical pluralism than to the unsophisticated dualist or relativist positions that students tend to take.
### Dualism

A simple dualist sees the world in terms of right and wrong answers, which are discovered by consulting an expert or using an authoritative method. They “believe that there is only a single way of looking at the world – that which they were taught and which they must master – and that the evidence for this is so plausible that there is no need to justify the belief” (Daniel et al., 2002, 4).

A more complex dualism arises when the simple dualist realises that even though most views or answers are either right or wrong there are some contexts where the authorities have not distinguished correct from incorrect answers. Although in principle the complex dualist categorises all knowledge as ‘true’ or ‘false’, in practice they leave room for multiplicity, controversy and disagreement where there is no authority to adjudicate disputes. This complex version of dualism relegates the multiplicity to isolated, special cases:

1. **Temporary period of data gathering**: Sometimes multiple conflicting views occur because not all the data has been gathered. In this case the dualist thinks we should temporarily suspend judgement until all the facts are in.

2. **Illegitimate mistake**: Some cases of multiplicity occur because one view is right while the others are wrong, confused, unjustified and mistaken. In this case, the dualist thinks that we should reject the muddled and unjustified views in favour of the truth.

3. **Opinion**: Other cases of multiplicity occur in contexts where there is no right and wrong, and everyone is entitled to their own opinion. Thus multiplicity in certain fields, such as ethics or politics, is taken by the dualist to indicate that these areas are really just a matter of opinion or taste. This version of dualism takes the position that there are either right and wrong answers, or everything is a matter of opinion. So although they usually see the world from the dualist position, in some circumstances they take a relativist position (and all the associated difficulties).

### Table 1: Summary of the features of three main epistemological positions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Epistemic position</th>
<th>Nature of knowledge</th>
<th>Conceptions of learning</th>
<th>Valued educational outcomes</th>
<th>How they interpret disagreement</th>
<th>Progress</th>
<th>Difficulty for P4C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dualism</td>
<td>Certainty, absolute, unchanging, immutable</td>
<td>Given knowledge or have it given to us by the authority of the teacher, from book or expert</td>
<td>Correct answers</td>
<td>Mistake</td>
<td>By getting to the right answers or truth</td>
<td>Diagnostic entrenchment, over-simplification, reliance on epistemic authority and the &quot;right&quot; or &quot;wrong&quot; adherence to views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relativism</td>
<td>Personal opinion</td>
<td>Personal opinion</td>
<td>Expression of opinions</td>
<td>Personal attack</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Detachment, paralysis, nihilism, apathy, opportunism, escape from commitment and the &quot;right&quot;, &quot;wrong&quot; adherence to views</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Realism</td>
<td>Construct knowledge or meaning within objective constraints from the world, logic and intersubjective perspectives and critical evaluation</td>
<td>Construct knowledge or meaning within objective constraints from the world, logic and intersubjective perspectives and critical evaluation</td>
<td>Reflective judgements based on balanced views and critical evaluation</td>
<td>&quot;an instrument that allows them to judge, refine, clarify and justify their ideas&quot; (Daniel et al., 2002, 4)</td>
<td>By developing epistemically better arguments for further inquiry and learning</td>
<td>Complexity which is difficult to navigate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dualist students tend to be answer-focused, superficial thinkers who lack sophisticated standards to deal with philosophical complexity. Because the dualist sees the world in terms of the crude standards of right and wrong, the dualist has a tendency towards superficiality. They cannot appreciate the nuances, subtle distinctions and shades of grey that are so important to philosophy. If answers are classified as right or wrong, there is no room to discern the richness and depth of different possible philosophical answers that “can be more or less intelligent, well thought out, insightful, compassionate and life enhancing” or “more or less obtuse, stymieing or pernicious” (Cam, 2006, 25).

The dualist also tends to passively over-rely on external epistemic authorities rather than develop the independence of judgement necessary for P4C. From a dualist perspective the aim of P4C is to get the right answers and these are best obtained from the teacher or other expert, or from other authoritative methods such as measuring, calculating, or empirical research.

This leads to further difficulties for P4C. Because it is right answers that are valuable, dualist students will have impatience with the confusion, ambiguity, multiple answers and complex inquiry that are central to P4C. “Just tell us the answer!” is their demand, but P4C cannot provide the certain or decisive conclusions they seek. They also try to use authoritative sources and methods to get these answers. While this might be appropriate for empirical questions, it is inappropriate for answering genuine philosophical questions and resolving philosophical problems (Golding, 2006, 2007, 2008). The result is that dualist students easily get bored with P4C dialogue because they “have an impression of ‘getting nowhere’ with their ideas” (Daniel et al., 2002, 7). If they remain dualists, they give up on philosophy because it does not produce the outcomes or products they expect or can make sense of.

One of the biggest difficulties P4C faces from dualism is if students become entrenched in a dualist position. An entrenched dualist retreats to closed-minded, one-sided, black and white dogmatism and refuses to engage in dialogue or acknowledge any legitimate perspective except their own. This is the most extreme dualist position where students see the world in terms of their view (the right view) and every other view (the wrong views). When there is controversy or disagreement, they dogmatically align or adhere with the authorities (us vs. them) or oppose authorities (I’m right and they’re wrong). Dogmatists claim: “It just is true,” or “I don’t care what you say, this is the right answer.” They give up trying to back up their judgements and systematically ignore any complexity that might challenge their point of view. When students take this position, P4C dialogue cannot go anywhere because students refuse to move.

Relativism

Perry argues that students often become relativists because dualism fails to adequately deal with the multiplicity they experience. They try to classify all ideas as right or wrong, but this proves to be impossible without taking a dogmatist position. Rather than dogmatically asserting that some things are just right, they instead take a relativist position where there is no such thing as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. They replace ‘true’ with ‘true-for-me’, which functions merely as a synonym for ‘my opinion’. This leads them to the position that all opinions are equally viable and “everyone has a right to their own opinions” and thus every philosophical view is epistemically no better or worse than any other.

When students take a relativist epistemic position, they value getting their own personal view across and enjoy hearing the opinions of others. Common comments might be “I liked hearing what others had to say” and “It was good to have our own say”. However, the emphasis is merely on sharing opinions but not on critically evaluating them. When different students express contrary views with seemingly good reasons to back them up, a relativist student would not critically engage with these views and might say: “The answer just depends,” or “Whatever answer you give is right for you,” or “It’s all a matter of opinion.”

Students taking a relativist position are unable or unwilling to make a commitment to one view being epistemically better than another. There are at least four ways relativists tend to reject the possibility of legitimate ways to evaluate one view as epistemically better than another:

1. Bland tolerance: If it is all a matter of opinion, students can take the generally positive position that everyone can believe
what they want. All views are equally good and so we should respect and tolerate them all. Under this sort of position, it would be wrong to criticise or evaluate the views of others as they are as good as our own.

2. Epistemic and moral indifference: A neutral relativist position that students can take is what Sproat (2001, 177) calls ‘indifference’. Under this position, moral and epistemic reasons and reasoning are considered irrelevant and are ignored.

3. Apathy: Alternatively, students could take the neutral position that it is all opinion in the end so there is no point in discussing anything.

4. Epistemic and moral nihilism: At its most extreme, the apathetic view can become the negative position of nihilism. If it is all a matter of opinion, students can take a position of universal scorn, cynicism and rejection for all views. All views are equally unjustified and worthless.

The difficulties relativism poses for P4C

Relativism implies the over-valuing of unreflective opinions and the under-valuing of critical judgements. All views are equally bad or equally good and so there is no point in critique, analysis or reflective judgements. What counts instead is expressing an opinion and stating preferences (and for many relativists, being tolerant and respectful of the opinions and preferences of others). Given how important critical, reflective judgements are to philosophy, this is a problematic position for P4C.

Relativism involves an escape from having to get ‘to the bottom’ of an issue. Because there are only preferences and opinions, the relativist can believe whatever they like without reflection or evaluation. Eckersley calls the tendency to take such a position in the face of disagreement, diversity and complexity, a ‘postmodern’ tendency (2004, 47). He argues that this is appealing because it relieves “us of the effort to try to make sense of a world that no longer seems to make sense” (2004, 211). When the dualist standards of right and wrong are not sophisticated enough to give students a direction or help them make progress sorting out complex philosophical issues, it is easier to give up than having to deal with the complexity. Thus students can escape to relativism and the “deceptive security of retreating behind [their] own uncritical opinions” (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, 135).

The escapism of relativism is a difficulty for P4C given the aim is for students to make deliberative judgements about controversial issues that are real and important to them. From a relativist perspective trying to make judgments about or to resolve philosophical issues is pointless. We can’t get it right even if we try, and one answer is as good as any other because we can’t get it wrong. The relativist position also poses a difficulty for P4C because it can express itself as a kind of opportunism where students play along with whatever the P4C teacher asks without real engagement or commitment. In the P4C classroom if the teacher asks them to give a balanced opinion they will do so even though, as relativists, they do not think there is any value in this. They manifest the outward forms of philosophical inquiry, but they are just going through the motions. Thus relativism can cause difficulties for P4C if students merely participate in philosophical dialogue as if it were a game or diversion that has no real meaning for their lives.

The difficulties both dualism and relativism pose for P4C

Both dualism and relativism hinder the genuine dialogue and critical inquiry that is essential for P4C. At the relativist extreme everything is a matter of opinion so there is no point in critical dialogue; at the dualist extreme dialogue is equally uncritical because it is restricted to apprehending and grasping this truth. Relativism and dualism thus leave students as easy victims to blind, uncritical acceptance of prejudice, preconception or ideology. Neither encourages the dialogue and critical inquiry which are so important to philosophy’s ability to combat such unreasonable biases.

Furthermore, both dualism and relativism encourage monologue where students express their views “without being influenced by the divergent points of view expressed by peers” (Daniel, 2008, 39). If they are dualist there is no need for them to listen to the views of other students who do not have the authority to assert that a view is right or wrong. They just want the right answer as ‘certified’ by an epistemic authority. If they are a relativist then everyone’s views have equal
epistemic standing and there is no need to take into consideration what anyone else thinks. While students adopt a dualist or relativist position, the diological inquiry of P4C is fundamentally pointless for them.

Neither dualists nor relativists need to take much responsibility for their views and answers. Either the authority of an expert or ‘the facts’ determines which views are correct, or any view is acceptable. Either way, they need take no responsibility for, or make a reflective choice about, the views they hold. But philosophical commitment in the form of reflective judgements is essential for P4C and is incompatible with the certainty of dualism and the indifference of relativism.

The source of the difficulties both dualism and relativism pose for P4C is that these positions lack the resources to understand what is required for productive philosophical inquiry. Philosophy is inherently controversial and requires nuance, independent judgement and justification which neither dualism nor relativism can support. When students do philosophy from these positions they do violence to philosophy without even realising it.

Dualism is inadequate because the standards it uses are too black-and-white to deal with philosophical questions. I have elsewhere argued that philosophical questions and problems cannot be given straightforward ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers (Golding, 2006, 2007, 2008). This point has widespread agreement in the P4C literature. Philosophical questions “point to problems that cannot be solved by calculation, or by consulting a book, or by remembering what the teacher has said” (Cam, 1995, 15). “Not only is there no consensus as to what constitutes a satisfactory answer, there is no consensus as to what constitutes a satisfactory method for even beginning to answer the question” (Spitzer & Sharp, 1995, 95). “In fact philosophy involves precisely this perpetual effort to come to grips with questions that permit no simple solution and that require continual rephrasing and reformulation” (Lipman et al., 1980, 28). If this is an accurate description of philosophical questions, then seeing them in dualist terms as having ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ answers will oversimplify them and misunderstand their nature.

Relativism is also inadequate as it ignores the philosophical complexity and holds that all philosophical views have the same epistemic status. Relativism rejects the need to make critical judgements, but this is incompatible with philosophy which just is the attempt to make critical judgements and evaluations in the face of complexity and pluralism.

Critical pluralism

Critical pluralism is the last and highest of the three positions that students develop, though it occupies the logical middle-ground position between dualism and relativism. It is more complex than either of the other two epistemic positions and preserves their strengths without raising their difficulties. The dualist’s epistemic view of the world is in terms of right and wrong answers. The relativist’s perspective is in terms of equally valid opinions. The critical pluralist’s epistemic view is in terms of well reasoned and poorly reasoned judgements according to intersubjective standards. Like dualism, but unlike relativism, critical pluralism can class some views as epistemically legitimate and others as indefensible, illegitimate and unreasonable. Like relativism, but unlike dualism, critical pluralism acknowledges legitimate epistemic pluralism and is tolerant of complexity and ambiguity. There is not one correct view, but multiple defensible views. Like a relativist, the critical pluralist is free of the need to be right, but unlike the relativist, they can apply epistemic standards to judge some views as better than others. For a critical pluralist, views are more or less intersubjectively defensible or warranted. There are better or worse answers to philosophical questions without there being one absolute truth.

A dualistic picture oversimplifies the complexity of philosophical issues while relativism lumps all views into an undifferentiated mass. Neither gives students resources for navigating complex philosophical issues. Critical pluralism, on the other hand, provides a position from which students can make sense of the pluralism of philosophy. Thus critical pluralism does have the resources to deal with the controversial nature of philosophy:

Philosophy provides a point of balance between the extremes of learning facts over which one has no control, and seeing the world entirely subjectively, as though everything were merely a matter of personal opinion or taste. In the balance, philosophy
teaches students how to make reasoned and reasonable judgements (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, 91).

The critical pluralist can make a commitment to one judgement rather than another, but they can do this responsibly. Rather than deferring responsibility to some epistemic authority to determine the answer, as a dualist might, they are personally responsible for determining which view they judge is the better one, and for clearly justifying it so it can be defended intersubjectively. Rather than giving up all responsibility and holding that anything goes, as a relativist might, they try to discover the most defensible views and take a stand even though there may be other potentially legitimate alternatives. Unlike dualism or relativism, the critical pluralist is influenced in their judgements by criticism and evaluation from others. Intersubjective critical inquiry enables them to test the views they construct and find the most defensible, but ultimately they are personally responsible for the judgements they make.

Although taking a critical pluralist position removes many of the difficulties associated with dualism or relativism, this position does not make P4C simple. Those who take the critical pluralist position are responsible for thinking through the complexity of philosophical issues, and this is difficult work. Reasoned judgements about the complex issues of philosophy are hard to come by and students need skills, dispositions and perseverance to come to them. The danger with a critical pluralist position is that in pursuing reasoned judgements, students will become baffled and lose their way. Every philosophical view seems to have good reasons to support it and so students will find it difficult to make up their mind. They see too many legitimate options and may become baffled and unable to choose a way forward. Secondly, teachers need to take on a new role as a fellow inquirer rather than as the source and evaluator of knowledge. This requires new skills and dispositions for the P4C teachers, as well as transforming the class into a Community of Inquiry.

**Critical pluralism and sophisticated dualism and relativism**

Before I consider how students could move from dualism and relativism to critical pluralism, I want to address one major objection to my argument. I have argued that dualism and relativism provide difficulties for P4C and are to be transcended to reach critical pluralism. Yet there is a strong theme in philosophy stretching back to Plato that philosophy is the search for truth which seems to be a dualist position. Rather than examining all the versions of this argument, I will consider the version Susan Gardner raises about P4C in particular:

A Community of Inquiry is neither teacher-centred and controlled nor student-centred and controlled, but centred on and controlled by the demands of truth. Truth is absolutely essential to this method; it is only because of progress toward truth that participants are ultimately convinced of the fruitfulness of the process... If a Community of Inquiry is to be worthy of its name, it must make some progress toward “the truth” (Gardner, 1995, 38)

Susan Gardner (1995, 1997, 1998) has championed the conception of P4C inquiry as truth-seeking in order to combat the view of P4C as a mere conversation. Although she does not explicitly make this claim, she seems to be arguing that P4C should be truth-directed in order to avoid the problems that result when teachers and students take an unsophisticated relativist position about P4C. However, my argument seems to relegate her position to that of dualism which, I claim, prevents productive philosophical inquiry and dialogue. It seems that I have to reject Gardner’s particular argument and also the well-established view that philosophy seeks truth if I am to continue arguing that dualism should be rejected in favour of critical pluralism for P4C.

My reply is that I think that there is a terminological confusion here and critical pluralism and Gardner’s view of truth are compatible. What Gardner means by truth is more like what I mean by intersubjective critical judgements than final truths. She says: “To say of something that it is true is not to say anything more than that it has undergone and survived a process” (Gardner, 1998, 85), and the process she describes is that of making reasoned judgements not of finding truth ready-made. Also:

It is a common lay assumption that ... scientists discover objective truths that stand the test of time and all further battering by relevant evidence. By contrast, it becomes almost self-evident that philosophy can never achieve such high
standards of truth; that philosophers can never discover, once and for all, what counts as fair, just or good (Gardner, 1997, 103).

Thus her position might be re-phrased, in line with my argument, as P4C inquiry requires critical pluralism.

Gardner (1997, 102) also argues that truth is the motivator for inquiry or "the prime mover" and that truth-seeking is what distinguishes the philosopher from the sophist or the merely clever, skilled thinker using rhetoric and persuasiveness to win an argument. In this context we can also replace 'truth' with 'better view' or 'progress' in the sense that critical pluralism understands it and retain the same sort of motivation for inquiry and the same distinction between the sophist and the philosopher. Philosophers seek to develop better views and to make progress and this is what motivates critical philosophical inquiry.

There are also other ways of conceiving of 'truth' similar to Gardner's, that are more complex and reflective than the dualist position described in this paper. For example, we could take a Socratic or Hegelian dialectic conception which acknowledge that partial truths can be present in a conception and that these truths cannot be found ready-made but must be discovered in a process of inquiry. Similarly, we might see truth in the way Peirce (1877) or Habermas (1972) does as the result of an ideal inquiry or as emerging from dialogue as Gadamer does (1975). However, each of these positions has more in common with critical pluralism than dualism, despite the common term 'truth'.

Sophisticated dualist positions are, in practice, equivalent to critical pluralism. Imagine a sophisticated fallibilist dualist, ready to be challenged by contrary views and open to the possibility that even their cherished beliefs may turn out to be false, and thus ready to relinquish their beliefs if confronted by a justified critique. In theory this might be classified as a type of dualism, but in practice such a position is closer to critical pluralism. Someone taking such a position is different from the unsophisticated dualist I describe in this paper because they do not think that views are simply and self-evidently true or false. The sophisticated, fallibilist dualist acknowledges that they cannot tell for sure whether they have the truth or not and so they rely on the same sort of criteria that critical pluralists might use to judge whether a view is the best one to hold (perhaps coherence with other conceptions, knowledge and experience). The only real difference between such a sophisticated dualism and critical pluralism is the theoretical commitment to eventually reaching some final truth. But if a sophisticated dualism thought there could be no final truth, but only a fallible and tentative truth, then they are a critical pluralist in all but name. Thus a sophisticated dualism can be just what I mean by 'critical pluralism'. I think something similar could be said about sophisticated forms of relativism that holds that all views are contingent and partial in some way and thus that all judgements will have to be made 'relative' to some standard or criteria. Thus the problem for P4C is unsophisticated versions of dualism and relativism, and the solution is to help move students to critical pluralism which may include sophisticated dualist and relativist positions.

Yet the terminological differences are not trivial. By using the word 'truth', students and teachers are likely to hear the unsophisticated dualist version of 'truth'. If students are encouraged to seek the 'true answer' in philosophy, they can tend to understand this as the one that is backed by the authority of the 'facts', or more often the authority of the teacher or the text-book, rather than the complex sense of truth advocated by the philosophers above. Thus the term 'critical pluralism' may be preferable to 'truth' as it is less likely to lead to the difficulties associated with dualism. The same can be said about sophisticated versions of relativism. Claiming that "there are no right and wrong answers in philosophy" is likely to be interpreted as an endorsement for the unsophisticated relativist position that everything is a mere opinion, rather than an endorsement of the sophisticated epistemic position the teacher has in mind.

How do students move from dualism and relativism to critical pluralism?

Given the way dualism and relativism interfere with the success of P4C, I argue that P4C needs to pay explicit attention to helping
students (and teachers) to move to critical pluralism.¹ In this paper I will not make detailed proposals about how this might be done, but I will outline some brief considerations and suggestions.

Daniel et al. point to a way of encouraging the development of critical pluralism: One lesson of philosophy per week for longer than a year. I support this, but I think that as well as enculturation into the current praxis of P4C, there needs to be a deeper intervention involving a re-conceptualisation of truth, knowledge and meaning.

Perry argues that critical pluralism can spontaneously develop in young adults when they are confronted by multiplicity. This would imply that merely confronting students with philosophical pluralism, disagreement and complexity could spur them to move to the position of critical pluralism without the need for explicit guidance. All the P4C teacher need do is orchestrate the dialogue so students are confronted with incongruent conceptions. In particular they could create disequilibrium for dualists by highlighting that there is disagreement amongst epistemic authorities, and disequilibrium for relativists by highlighting that people can judge that one view is better than another despite disagreement and pluralism.

However, Perry also argues that confrontation with multiplicity does not automatically result in a movement to critical pluralism. Some students get ‘stuck’ or ‘entrenched’ in a dogmatic position or ‘escape’ to a relativist position. Daniel et al.’s research also indicates that younger children do not spontaneously take the position of critical pluralism (2002, 16), but they can move to this position with guidance (2002, 16). Thus P4C must consider how to ensure that students move to critical pluralism.

To formulate an explicit process for the development of critical pluralism, P4C must consider the different ways we can move to new positions or remain with our old ones. As Perry pointed out, to move to a new epistemic position we need to be confronted by multiplicity. But this does not always result in a move, nor a move to critical pluralism. We move to a new position or stay embedded in our current position depending on how we respond to experiences and views that are incongruent with our current epistemic positions. There are four general ways we might respond to experiences and views that challenge our positions:

1. Rejection: We can disregard the discrepant experience or view as illegitimate or unreal in some way. For example, dogmatism is built on rejecting as false, mistaken or confused any challenging information and experiences.

2. Compartmentalisation: We keep incompatible positions and conceptions compartmentalised from each other. We might have one explicit position we articulate in exams or when asked by the teacher, and a different incompatible but implicit position that we act on outside educational contexts.¹

3. Assimilation: We add new knowledge into our current positions. We do this by incorporating what we experience and the new views within our already existing structures.

4. Accommodation: We transform our position so that it can now make sense of the discrepant experiences or views. Rather than fitting what the new experiences and views into our existing structures, we transform our existing structures to make sense of the otherwise discrepant experiences and views.

The first three responses are ways of remaining in our current positions. Research has shown that these are our likely responses when our positions are challenged. Although our positions may be highly inaccurate, they tend to be extremely robust and we find it difficult to abandon them (Gardner, 1989, 5-6). It is far easier to reject challenging experiences as illegitimate or to compartmentalise and assimilate them than it is to transform our positions.

Compartmentalising or rejection is the likely result when knowledge that challenges a position is merely transmitted to students without a chance for them to assimilate or accommodate it. The transmitted information is merely “superimposed” against the existing position and remains “inert” (Paul, 1994, 340; Gardner, 1989, 120). For assimilation or accommodation to occur, students need to

¹. It is possible that students might already take the position of critical pluralism when they start P4C, but Perry and Daniel’s studies show this to be very unlikely. Also, the possibility of a few precocious students does not mean that this is not an important area to focus on for the majority of students.
“confront, assess and reconstruct these often primitive understandings” (Splitter & Sharp, 1995, 42). Students need a chance to problematise their positions, new experiences and their perspectives, and re-construct something new. In other words, P4C students need a chance to inquire into their epistemic positions.

For P4C to move students to critical pluralism, it must encourage them to accommodate discrepant experiences and challenges in new transformed positions. Students need to be stimulated to do this by being confronted with experiences that they cannot reject, assimilate or compartmentalise into their dualist or relativist positions, and so they have to develop critical pluralism in the place of dualism or relativism.

The pedagogy of P4C and the move to critical pluralism

The pedagogy of P4C will have a significant impact on the development of complex epistemic positions. But given students and teachers experience and interpret the pedagogy of P4C through their epistemic positions, I do not think the pedagogy of P4C, as currently articulated, will be enough. In this section I suggest that we need to supplement the knowledge P4C has developed about educating thinking and developing a mature Community of Inquiry, with further pedagogy for developing complex epistemic positions.

The pedagogical tools, techniques and methods that P4C uses for encouraging complex thinking and a Community of Inquiry are likely to be ineffective in the face of dualist or relativist epistemic positions. Whatever teaching practices are employed in the P4C class will be interpreted by the students through their relativist or dualist perspective, and will be presented from the teachers’ dualist or relativist position, and thus will end up promoting dualism or relativism rather than critical pluralism.

P4C pedagogy encourages the P4C teacher to do such things as:

- Encourage students to sit in a circle, to talk to each other, to be active as part of the inquiry process and to put forward their own questions and answers.
- Claim ignorance of the answers to questions discussed, or at least be neutral about substantive philosophical answers, and refuse to put forward anything like a ‘right’ answer.
- Ask the students to present alternative views, justify their answers, and agree and disagree with what others say.

If students are dualists, as both Perry and Hildebrand (1999, 380) argue, they have three options for interpreting such P4C pedagogy, each of which involves seeing P4C as the search for right answers:

1. They can interpret the P4C pedagogy as indicating the teacher, who already has the truth, has hidden it from the students. The students are asked to be active and answer questions so they learn how to find the truth for themselves. However, because the teacher already possesses the truth, the students will try to find out what answer the teacher really thinks is the right answer and then parrot it back to the teacher. Seen from this perspective, it seems legitimate for students to complain: “Just tell me the answer.”

2. Alternatively they could interpret the P4C pedagogy as indicating that the teacher is inexact or confused and cannot clearly articulate the truth, or that the teacher is ignorant and does not know the truth. From this perspective, the P4C pedagogy will seem pointless and just a cover-up for bad teaching.

3. Dualist students could also be more sophisticated and interpret the P4C pedagogy as a method for both teacher and students to find the truth together. Yet the dualist still sees that the aim is to get the right answers and avoid the wrong answers. They may suspend judgement for a time, but if no views can be shown to be incontrovertibly true (as is the case with philosophy), they will eventually give up on such pointless inquiry.

The relativist student, on the other hand, will interpret P4C pedagogy as an elaborate way to let everyone have their say. The teacher’s refusal to impose their answers on students, from this perspective, indicates that answers are unimportant, and any answer is
as good as another (Sprod, 2001, 178-180). Active participation and answering questions are thus merely seen as opportunities for every student to share their opinion and get to know what others think.

The pedagogy of P4C is ineffective at encouraging critical pluralism when the epistemic positions taken by students causes them to misinterpret the pedagogy. It can also be ineffective when the P4C teacher misinterprets the P4C pedagogy and presents it from a dualist or relativist position. If this is the case, the teacher only superficially follows the P4C pedagogy but without the substance.

In general the dualist teacher will see their job as leading students to the truth. This could be like a tour-guide who has a destination in mind or like the leader of an expedition where neither the teacher nor the students know the truth before hand. Either way, they see their job as discovering the truth and then bringing the students to it. They will see themselves as being like Socrates leading the slave boy through the steps of a geometric proof in the *Meno* or Kingsfield grilling his students in the film *The Paper Chase* (Burbules, 1993, 89). The questions they ask and the tasks they assign to students will be more or less subtle ways of controlling and leading the students (Burbules, 1993, 103; Paul, 1994, 418). Although they will look like they are performing all the actions required by P4C pedagogy, they will still think there are truths to be found and thus will be likely to impose what they think is the truth (either pre-decided or discovered by them in the inquiry) on students rather than encouraging independent critical judgement.

The relativist teacher, on the other hand, will allow the students a lot more freedom to be active in the discussion. In fact they will offer so much freedom that the students will be essentially abandoned. Whatever ideas they come up with are acceptable for the relativist teacher. The essential aim of all the P4C pedagogical practices, seen from a relativist perspective, is to make sure everyone has a say. The relativist teacher may press students to give reasons and even to agree and disagree, but this will merely appear similar to critical evaluation. Because students are still allowed to have whatever opinion and justification they like, it is not actual critical evaluation but merely sharing reasons.

The epistemic position the P4C teacher takes also affects their ability to maieutically help students to ‘give birth to’, or scaffold, critical pluralism. Rather than moving students to critical pluralism, the dualist teacher fosters dualist students and the relativist teacher fosters relativist students (Daniel, 2008, 45-46). This is because P4C teachers cannot recognise critical pluralism while they occupy the position of dualism or relativism. For a dualist, students acting from the position of critical pluralism look like they are getting confused and need more direction. For a relativist, they look like they are merely swapping opinions. Dualist and relativist teachers will be unable to tell the difference between dogmatic and relativist students, those that that are just pretending to play the P4C game and those who have genuinely moved to critical pluralism.

But if teachers cannot recognise critical pluralism, then they cannot scaffold students to reach this position, nor recognise if they succeed. A dualist or relativist teacher would not ask for the deeper critical dialogue needed for critical pluralism because they do not know any better. The dualist teacher merely asks for students to assent to the truth as they see it. The relativist teacher merely asks for students to share their views. So, to help students to reach the complex epistemic position of critical pluralism the teacher must already occupy this position.

**A back-door is left open for dualism and relativism**

I have argued that P4C cannot be practised from a dualist or relativist position. Yet dualism and relativism are still legitimate, defensible philosophical positions held by a variety of respectable philosophers. I do not want to make the bold claim that all possible versions of these positions should be rejected for the reasons raised in this paper. Instead I want to leave a back-door open for dualism and relativism.

I still argue that critical pluralism is a better epistemic position to take for P4C than unsophisticated dualism or relativism. However, from the position of critical pluralism we might reach a sophisticated philosophical dualist or relativist position. Given a framework of critical pluralism, a defensible argument might be made for dualism or relativism as second-order positions. It might be argued, for example, that the best way to resolve the problems addressed in the current epistemological literature is by taking the view that there are final
truths that we aim for when we do philosophy. I acknowledge the possibility of dualism or relativism as reasoned judgements reached as the result of applying inter-subjective critical evaluation, even though I reject uncritical, unsophisticated relativism and dualism as the basis of P4C pedagogy.

Conclusion
The epistemic positions taken by P4C students and teachers can cause difficulties for developing a successful and productive P4C class. For example, if students see knowledge and values in black and white dualist terms this can lead to: dogmatism, over-simplification of complex issues and over-reliance on external authority and facts. Alternatively if students see the world in relativist terms where all views have equal epistemic status as opinions, this may lead to: detachment, apathy, and abandonment of critical engagement. Instead, students need to take a position of critical pluralism and see knowledge and values as more or less well-reasoned or warranted based on the quality of inter-subjective critical evaluation.

However, moving students to the position of critical pluralism is not a simple matter of acquiring new skills and dispositions or developing a Community of Inquiry. It will require a fundamental transformation of how students and teachers interpret the knowledge and meaning sought in P4C. This transformation requires new pedagogy from P4C. Given the controversial nature of philosophy, P4C students will be confronted by many views and experiences that will challenge their simple epistemic positions. However, there is no guarantee that by participating in P4C as currently conceived, that they will move to critical pluralism rather than escape to relativism or become entrenched in dogmatism. They will tend to assimilate new experiences and views into their relativist or dualist position, because they are ‘seen’ through the lens of their positions. If the P4C teacher also takes a relativist or dualist position, then they will make it even harder for students to reach critical pluralism.

The intention of this paper is to open up further pedagogical debate on the issue of the epistemic positions of P4C students and teachers. I argue that this issue needs to be given greater attention in the P4C literature because of the fundamental implications it has for P4C pedagogy and teacher training. The pedagogy must take into account not just development of skills and community, but also the development of epistemic positions. The training of teachers must involve not just training in what to do, but transformation of how they conceive. Sophisticated epistemic positions are necessary for productive, successful P4C classes, and this needs to be reflected in future P4C literature.

References


